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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. The issues presented on appeal are whether the 
trial court properly allowed the results of the field sobriety 
tests and the refusal of the breath test to be admitted as 
evidence, 
II. Whether a routine traffic stop and inquiry is an 
investigatory interrogation and as suchf does not require a 
Miranda warning in order to allow pre-arrest statements to be 
admitted into evidence. 
III. Whether field sobriety tests do not violate a 
person1s constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- v -
EARL W. EAST, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment issued by the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornabyr presiding. 
The Second District Court affirmed the decision of the 
Honorable K. Roger Beanf Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court, 
Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah. 
The Fourth Circuit Court found appellant guilty of 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of 
U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2). In reaching that decision, Judge Bean 
denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence of the field 
sobriety tests and of the refusal of the breathalyzer test. 
On appeal, Judge Cornaby affirmed the lower court's 
decision to deny appellant's motion. The Fourth District Court 
held that: 
1. The peace officer had reasonable grounds to stop 
appellant's car because of apparent traffic violations. 
Case No. 20900 
Category No. 2 
2. A stop for a traffic offense does not require a 
Miranda warning. 
3. The officer correctly investigated the possibility 
that appellant was intoxicated after the officer noted an odor of 
alcohol. 
4. The officer properly requested appellant to take 
field sobriety tests. 
5. The appellant voluntarily consented to take the 
tests. 
6. Field sobriety tests do not violate appellant's 
right against self-incrimination because such tests are not 
testimonial or communicative evidence. 
7. After the field sobriety tests, the officer 
formally arrested appellant for DUI and gave him his Miranda 
warning. The officer then properly requested appellant to take a 
breathalyzer test which he refused to do. 
8. The appellant's right against self-incrimination 
was not violated and the results of the field tests and of the 
refusal of the breath test were properly admitted in the trial 
court as evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 10, 1985, Officer Neal Wagner and Assisting 
Officer Wilford Jensen, while driving southbound on 1-15, 
observed a vehicle speeding northbound in the opposite direction 
at 68 miles an hour (T.4). The officers turned their vehicle 
around and followed the speeding automobile for approximately two 
miles (T.5). During that time, the officers saw the vehicle 
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change lanes twice without signaling and weave across the lane 
divider twice (T.5). 
The officers stopped the vehicle. The appellant, 
responding to Officer Wagner1s questions, produced his driver's 
license and said he had had a couple of beers (T.5). The 
officer, noting an odor of alcohol and slow speech, asked 
appellant to take some field sobriety tests. The appellant 
replied, "I will." Appellant performed the tests poorly (T.6 and 
7) . 
Following the field sobriety tests, Officer Wagner 
placed appellant under arrest, gave him the Miranda warning, and 
asked him to take a breathalyzer test. Appellant refused (T.7). 
He was belligerent and argumentative (T.7). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The trial court and the district court on appeal was 
constitutionally correct in admitting evidence of field sobriety 
tests and refusal to take the chemical test in appellantfs DUI 
trial. The admitting of the evidence does not violate the 
appellant's Federal 5th amendment rights as the evidence was 
given in a non-custodial circumstance which does not require a 
Miranda warning. In addition, the evidence given was not 




THE TRIAL COURT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT 
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD SOBRIETY 
TESTS. 
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A. AN INVESTIGATORY STOP AND INQUIRY DOES 
NOT REQUIRE A MIRANDA WARNING AND 
EVIDENCE ACQUIRED WITHIN THAT 
INVESTIGATORY INTERROGATION IS ADMISSIBLE, 
ESPECIALLY IF NOT COMPELLED. 
The purpose of the Miranda warning is to provide 
"procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination" found in the 5th Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 
436, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974 (1966). 
The necessity of Miranda arises when police conduct a custodial 
interrogation defined as "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." 
Xd. at 444. The U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Beheler. 103 
S. Ct. 3517 (1983) stated that whether the restraints on a 
suspect's freedom were significant depended upon the "ultimate 
inquiry" into whether there was "a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest." (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court has used two standards to determine 
when an investigation changes from investigatory to custodial. 
One is the "focus" test articulated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478f 12 L.Ed. 2d 977r 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964) and relied upon 
by appellant which states that when a police investigation is no 
longer a general one and indeed focuses on a particular suspect, 
then the investigation becomes custodial and Miranda is required. 
Another standard is the objective/subjective test used in 
Beckwith v. United Statesr 425 U.S. 341, 48 L.Ed. 2d l, 96 s. ct. 
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1612 (1976) and in Oregon v. Mathiason. 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 
711f 50 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1977) which applies Miranda if the actions 
of the police and the surrounding circumstances would reasonably 
lead a suspect to believe that he was not free to leave at will. 
See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda; What 
Constitutes Custodial InterrogaUon?r 25 s.c. L. Rev. 669 (1974). 
In Beckwith, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the "in 
custody" requirement could be satisfied simply because police 
questioned someone who was the "focus" of a criminal 
investigation. The Court made clear that "focus" is questioning 
"Altar." a person has been taken into custody. Beckwithr at 1616. 
(emphasis added) The Court now seems to look at the totality of 
the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not a 
suspect is in "custody." &££ Mathiason, Behelerr and Berkemer. 
In determining custodial interrogation and the necessity 
of Miranda protection, the Supreme Court specifically said that 
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine 
misdemeanor traffic stop is not a custodial interrogation. Post 
arrest questioning is custodial. Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 
U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984). The facts of 
that case and the case at bar are nearly identical. In BerkemerP a 
peace officer observed the suspect's car weaving across the 
lane divider. The officer stopped the car, requested the driver 
to get out of the vehicle, and asked him if he were intoxicated. 
The driver had difficulty standing, his speech was slurred 
and he responded saying that he had consumed two beers and 
smoked several joints of marijuana. The officer asked the 
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driver to perform a field sobriety test. After the testr the 
officer formally placed the driver under arrest and transported 
him to jail. 
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a traffic stop 
significantly curtails freedom of action because one is not free 
to ignore a policeman's signal or to drive away without 
permission. However, an ordinary traffic stop is not custodial 
because it is presumptively "temporary and brief" and a driver 
can usually expect that he will be allowed to continue on his 
way. Berkemer. at 333. Also, a typical traffic stop does not 
place a motorist completely at the mercy of the police because 
the stop is public and "noncoercive." Xd. Therefore, the stop 
was not custodial, Miranda was not applicable, and the statements 
of the driver and the results of the field sobriety test without 
a Miranda warning were admissible. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Salt Lake City v. 
earner, 664 P.2d 1168, (1983) conforms to that of the Supreme 
Court, earner involved a routine stop for a traffic violation 
which then developed into an arrest for driving while 
intoxicated. The Utah court said that "temporary detention for 
the purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations is not 
synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda 
warning." Garner at 1170. The court recognized four important 
factors in determining whether a suspect is in custody in the 
absence of a formal arrest. They are 1) the site of 
interrogation, 2) whether the investigation focused on the 
accused, 3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
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present; and 4) the length and form of interrogation, earner, 
at 1171. 
As in earner, the facts of the case at bar do not 
contain the circumstances needed for "custody." The field 
sobriety tests were requested and taken on a public street. No 
indicia of arrest such as handcuffs, guns, or locked doors were 
present. The performance of the tests lasted only a short 
period. The environment, though perhaps authoritative was not 
coercive. Additionally, as the Court in earner pointed out, 
although the investigation focused on the driver, "that was true 
at the point of initial observation; and no one would argue that 
a Miranda warning was obligatory at that point." CarnerP at 
1171. The U.S. Court also said mere "focus is not enough to 
trigger custody and consequently Miranda," S£& Beckwith. supra 
at p. 3. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have obviously seen the ridiculous consequences that would 
follow if appellant's focus and evidence against self arguments 
were accepted by the Court. Under appellant's proposed standard, 
all peace officers could only stop a vehicle for violations other 
than the DUI. Then they would be required to give the Miranda 
warning (presumably over a loud speaker), some time between 
having the window rolled down and smelling the odor associated 
with alcohol. After Miranda, the unarrested (because of lack of 
evidence) driver could refuse to cooperate or give even physical 
evidence and roll up the window and go to sleep until sober. The 
unsafe driver could drive while under the influence, until or 
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unless he is caught and then simply "take a nap" and never be 
successfully prosecuted for the offense of DUI. That adverse 
result would of course be contrary to public policy and public 
safety. 
In the instant casef appellant was pulled over because 
of a moving traffic violation. After the officer detected the 
odor of alcohol and slow speech, he could investigate, indeed he 
had a duty to investigatef "suspicious circumstances in order to 
determine whether a crime has been committed." earner, at 1170, 
citing State v, Carlsen, 480 P.2d 736 (Utah 1971). Miranda need 
not be given until the "police have both reasonable grounds to 
believe a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to 
believe that the defendant committed it." earner, at 1171. 2&S. 
jalfifl Berkemer at 334. Without an investigation, a police officer 
would seldom find the requisite probable cause and any subsequent 
arrest would be illegal. To require Miranda before any question 
or request would be "wholly impractical." Carlsen. at p. 737 and 
earner p. 1170 (on suppression of field tests). Field sobriety 
tests help to provide police with adequate probable cause to 
arrest an intoxicated driverr thereby making the highways safer 
and the tests also allow them to release the innocent driver. 
The police officer's questions and request directed at 
appellant to take field sobriety tests were investigatory in 
order to acquire probable cause for a formal arrest. Appellant's 
response to the questions and his agreement to take the field 
tests were voluntary and were not compelled by the officer. He 
in fact agreed by specifically stating, "I will" (T.6). The 
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fact that most people will respond to a police request and do so 
without being told that they are free not to respond does not 
"eliminate the consensual nature of the response." I.N.S. v. 
Delgado. 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984), and £am££ at 1172 (holding that 
the defendant was "not compelled to give evidence against himself 
in violation of our State constitution.") 
Since appellant was not in custody until his arrest, a 
Miranda warning was not needed until then. His pre-arrest 
statements and actions were voluntary. Thusr the appellant's 5th 
Amendment rights were not violated and the field test evidence 
was properly admitted by the trial court. 
Furthermore, the act of refusing and the statement of 
refusal to take the breathalyzer test was properly admitted as 
evidence before the trial court. The testimony was that the 
officer arrested appellant and gave him a Miranda warning before 
requesting him to take a breathalyzer test. (See Sworn DUI 
Report Form) £££ Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, appellant's subsequent acts and refusal statements were 
admissible evidence. 
The absence of a Miranda warning does not give a driver 
any right to refuse to take the test or to withdraw the consent 
authorized by statute. U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10(1) In a civil 
proceeding, it does not justify excluding evidence of the 
driver's statements and actions regarding that request. Smith v. 
£QX, 609 P.2d 1332. Holman1s statement requiring a Miranda 
warning in order to admit evidence of a refusal in a criminal 
proceeding would not apply to non-communicative acts such as 
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silencef especially when such silence or lack of action is deemed 
a refusal under Utah case law. See Beck v. Cox, 597 p.2d 1335 
(Utah 1979) and Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 1984)f 
requiring immediate consent. Such acts are not only non-
communicative but not given in the compulsory setting 
contemplated by Hixaiida. South Dakota v, Neville, 459 U.S. 553f 
103 S. Ct. 916r (1983). 
Howeverf in this case, appellant made an oral statement 
refusing to take the breathalyzer test. Such statement was 
voluntarily made and made following a Miranda warning and is 
therefore admissible in a criminal trial. 
B, FIELD SOBRIETY OR ROADSIDE TESTS DO 
NOT VIOLATE A PERSON'S PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THUS 
A MIRANDA WARNING IS NOT REQUIRED IN 
ORDER FOR SUCH EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED 
INTO A COURT OF LAW. 
In American Fork City v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1985) f the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s 
p r i v i l e g e against s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n in accordance with the 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment. The 
U.S. Supreme court held in Schmerber v. Californiar 384 U.S. 757, 
86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) that the fifth amendment 
privilege applies only to evidence of a "testimonial or 
communicative nature." The Utah Supreme Court held that Article 
lf section 2 of Utah's Constitution also protected an accused 
only from being compelled to give "evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature," not real and physical evidence. American 
Fork at 1075. The Utah Court stated that the difference in 
language between the two constitutions was insignificant in light 
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of the historical intent of the framers of the state document and 
in the common law definition and general acceptance that the 
privilege only protected one from "testifying" against oneself. 
Id. at 1072, 1073. 
By virtue of the holding in American Fork, the Utah 
court expressly overturned Hansen v. Owen. 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 
1980). The court rejected the idea that the Utah constitutional 
privilege was more inclusive than the privilege within the U.S. 
Constitution. Also, the court rejected the affirmative act 
standard used in Hansen which stated that an accused may not be 
compelled to actively produce evidence against himself or to 
perform any affirmative act that would produce such evidence. 
American Fork, at 107 4. Insteadr the Utah court followed the 
vast majority of jurisdictions and held that only testimonial and 
communicative evidence was protected and that the fifth amendment 
privilege did not prevent a state from acquiring real or physical 
evidence from an accused without his consent. American Fork, at 
1071, 1072. 
Field sobriety tests, under the standard set out in 
American Fork, being physical evidence, still would not violate a 
person's privilege against self-incrimination. Such tests are 
authorized investigatory observations of physical and 
nontestimonial evidence. SJ^S. Salt Lake v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1983) (J. Durham's concurring opinion). Therefore, the 
results of field tests are admissible into evidence and a Miranda 
warning is not required. 
-11-
Appellant argues that in order for American Fork to 
apply in this matter, it would have to be applied retroactively. 
However, this is not the case. American Fork was decided June 4f 
1985 and appellant was arrested on July 10, 1985. In any event, 
earner had been decided in 1983. 
In conclusion, since the field or roadside tests were 
not custodial, (Point I), not given in a Miranda type 
inquisition, not compelled, and not testimonial communications, 
then both Courts below were proper in admitting them into 
evidence according to Miranda conforming with this Courtfs 
holdings in in jCamex and American Fork. 
CONCLUSION 
Police must be allowed to stop drivers who are 
violating traffic laws and then to investigate any suspicious 
circumstances to determine if another crime of DUI is being 
committed. A routine traffic stop and inquiry is an 
investigatory interrogation; it is not custodial and so a Miranda 
warning is not required. Therefore, any statements especially 
voluntary ones, or actions made by appellant during the pre-
arrest investigation are admissible as evidence in a court of 
law. 
The request for field sobriety tests do not violate a 
person's privilege against self-incrimination under the United 
States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. The 
privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only from 
being required to give testimonial or communicative evidence 
against himself. Real or physical evidence is not included 
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within the privilege and therefore Miranda is not required. 
Since field sobriety tests are of a physical nature, evidence of 
such tests are admissible in a criminal proceeding. 
The respondent respectfully requests this court to 
uphold the findings of the district court and the circuit court. 
^ 
DATED this Oi day of April, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Phil L. 
Hansen, attorney for appellant, 800 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this ? /*- day of April, 1986. 
£ ^O ££_ 
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FILFO IN CLERK'S OFFICr 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial DistrictDAVIS CL i;TY ^AH 
I H A M D F O R T H . I3S5 AUG 28 AH 9= 1.3 
r* * rx • e f l i t . MICHAEL GALLPH'N. CLERK 
County of Davis, State of U t a h i«* oisnacT COURT 
DEPUTY CLEhrt 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifff 
vs. 
EARL W. EAST, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON APPEAL 
Criminal No. 4929 
This appeal came before the court on August 13, 1985, with 
Robert B. Hart appearing for the plaintiff and Phil L. Hansen 
appearing for the defendant. Counsel requested a one week con-
tinuance which the court granted. Counsel thereafter requested 
a ruling based upon the briefs filed with the court. The court 
now rules on the appeal. 
The arresting officer in this case stopped the defendant for 
speeding. There was also a driving pattern involving two lane 
changes without signaling and also the left wheels driving over 
the lane divider. The officer could smell an odor of alcohol on 
the defendant's breath on approaching him. At this point the of-
ficer could have issued the defendant a citation for speeding and 
allowed him to proceed on his way. However, he suspected driving 
under the influence of alcohol. This was a custodial stop. Ob-
viously the defendant was not free to leave. The defendant urges 
the court to require the Miranda warning at this time. Mere sus-
picion of a traffic offense does not require the Miranda warning. 
The officer asked the defendant how much he had to drink and he 
replied two beers. The officer properly requested the defendant 
to take field sobriety tests. The defendant consented. These 
tests did not require the officer to advise the defendant of a 
right against self-incrimination. The Utah Supreme Court in 
American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 stated: 
History supports the conclusion, ac- s^) m 
cepted by the vast majority of authorities, that &/ 
the commonlaw privilege is limited to testimonial ^j^% 
and communicative evidence only and not to evidence y y / 
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of a real of physical nature such as that obtained 
from a breathalyzer test." 
The field sobriety tests are not "testimonial and communicative 
evidence." 
After the field sobriety tests were given, the officer for-
mally arrested the defendant for DUI and gave him his Miranda 
warning. This was the appropriate procedure. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Holman vs. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979) said: 
" . . . However, when a driver suspected of driv-
ing under the influence is arrested, he is at that point 
involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the 
Miranda warning if his subsequent statements are to be 
admitted in a criminal proceeding against him . . . •• 
The Cox case involved the Driver License Division. The defendant 
urges that an arrest takes place when the defendant's free right 
of movement is stopped. This is technically correct, but the 
Supreme Court has never required the Miranda warning at the point. 
On the other hand it has not permitted officers to ask extensive 
questions under the guise of custodial investigation. In the 
case at hand the officer reasonably suspected DUI after giving 
the field sobriety tests. Having arrested the defendant for DUI 
it was proper to ask him to take a chemical test. 
The defendant's right against self-incrimination was not 
violated in this case and the lower court appropriately ruled. 
This case is ordered returned to the Layton Department of the 
Fourth Circuit Court with directions to execute the sentence. 
Dated August 23, 1985. 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Robert B. Hart, Davis 
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah and to Phil L. Hansen, 
800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on August 26, 
